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The Recurring Question of the "Limited"
Constitutional Convention
Walter E. Dellingert
Article V of the United States Constitution requires Congress to
call "a Convention for proposing Amendments" upon application of
two-thirds of the states.' Amendments proposed by such a convention,
if subsequently ratified by three-fourths of the states, become part of the
Constitution. Thus far in the history of the republic, no such conven-
tion has been called. In the last few years, however, thirty states2 have
submitted applications to Congress calling for a convention restricted
to consideration of an amendment requiring a balanced federal budget.
Only four more applications are necessary to reach the total of two-
thirds specified by Article V; Congress is said to have been brought
"to the brink of calling a constitutional convention.1'3
For a century following the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the
only applications submitted by state legislatures under Article V con-
templated conventions that would be free to determine their own
agendas.4 Only in this century have legislatures begun to submit ap-
t Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. Article V reads as follows:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amend-
ments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of
this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that . . . no State, without
its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
2. As of May 31, 1979, twenty-nine of these state resolutions had been printed in the
Congressional Record: 125 CONG. REC. S6085 (daily ed. May 16, 1979) (New Hampshire);
id. at S5017 (daily ed. May 1, 1979) (Indiana); id. at S2363 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1979)
(Arkansas and Utah); id. at S1931 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1979) (South Dakota); id. at S1932
(Idaho); id. at S1306 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979) (Alabama, Arizona, and Colorado); id. at
S1307 (Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, and Louisiana); id. at S108 (Maryland and
Mississippi); id. at S1309 (Nebraska and Nevada); id. at S1310 (New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Oregon); id. at S1311 (Pennsylvania and South Carolina); id. at
S1312 (Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia); id. at S1313 (Wyoming); id. at S1123 (daily ed.
Feb. 6, 1979) (North Carolina). As of May 31, 1979, the resolution by Iowa, S. J. Res. 1
(1979), had not been printed in the Congressional Record. For a discussion of the validity
of these applications, see p. 1636 infra.
3. National Law Journal, Mar. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
4. See Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189,
202-03 (1972).
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plications reflecting a different view. These applications are premised
upon three assumptions: (1) Congress may limit in advance the subject
matter authority of any convention called for proposing amendments;
(2) it is valid for states to specify in their applications that the conven-
tion be formally limited; and (3) Congress, in response to these requests
for a "limited subject matter" convention, must call a limited con-
vention, define the scope of the matters that may be considered in
accordance with the state applications, and require that the convention
stay within those limits.5
This article, however, argues that any new constitutional convention
must have authority to study, debate, and submit to the states for
ratification whatever amendments it considers appropriate. Although
such a convention might well decide to focus upon one issue, it cannot
be required to do so by Congress or the state legislatures. This article
also concludes that any state convention applications that are premised
on the erroneous view that a convention can be limited in advance
must be treated by Congress as invalid.
I. Evolution of Article V at the Philadelphia Convention
An examination of the debates over Article V at the Philadelphia
Convention establishes that the framers were concerned about the
role constitutional amendments might play in the allocation of power
between the state legislatures and the federal government. An analysis
of the evolution of Article V illuminates the framers' intentions with
respect to the role constitutional conventions should play, and sup-
ports the conclusion that the subject matter of such conventions cannot
be limited.
The delegates in Philadelphia generally agreed that provision should
5. The most insightful piece supporting the state legislatures' position is a recent
article by Professor William Van Alstyne, Does Article V Restrict the States to Calling
Unlimited Conventions Only?-A Letter to a Colleague, 1978 DuKm L.J. 1295. For earlier
arguments supporting the position that mandatory limits can be imposed on a convention,
see Rhodes, A Limited Federal Constitutional Convention, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1973);
Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and The Article V Convention Process, 66 MicH. L.
REV. 949 (1968); Note, Proposed Legislation on the Convention Method of Amending the
United States Constitution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1612, 1629 (1972). Other arguments defending
the validity of limited applications are included in Memorandum from J. Anthony Kline,
Legal Affairs Secretary, to Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California (Jan. 31,
1979) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as California Memorandum];
SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY Commra., AMERICAN BAR Assoc., AMENDMENT OF
THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION METHOD UNDER ARTICLE V (1974) [hereinafter cited
as ABA REPORT].
Professor Charles Black has been the leading advocate of the view that Article V con-
ventions cannot be limited in scope by either Congress or the state legislatures and that
state requests for the limited convention are invalid. See Black, supra note 4, at 189.
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be made for amendment of the new Constitution. Experience under
the Articles of Confederation, which provided that a single state could
veto amendments,0 persuaded the delegates of the need for an easier
revision process. But it also was understood that casual or frequent
amendment would threaten both the stability of the new government
and the delicate balance of compromises hammered out at the first
Convention.
The Philadelphia Convention readily agreed upon a method for
ratifying proposed amendments to the new Constitution. After con-
sidering motions to require unanimous ratification by the states, or
ratification by two-thirds, the Convention decided that approval by
three-fourths of the states should be necessary in order to ratify amend-
ments. 7 But a critical question remained: who should propose amend-
ments? What organ of government should be empowered to initiate,
develop and submit amendments for ratification? It proved particularly
difficult to decide whether Congress should have the power to veto
amendments the state legislatures wished to submit for ratification.
The resolution chosen by the delegates midway through the delibera-
tions was a grant of concurrent power to Congress and the state legisla-
tures to initiate the amendment process. The Convention easily agreed
on the method by which Congress would propose amendments,8 and
debate centered upon the alternative mode. Mason of Virginia ob-
jected to congressional control over the proposal of amendments be-
cause congressional abuses of power might be the cause of the perceived
need for reform.9 Set against this concern was the threat, perceived by
Hamilton, that the states would seek amendment to enhance their
power at the expense of the federal government.' 0 This debate re-
flected the tension felt throughout the entire Convention between the
need to create an effective national structure, significantly stronger
than the one existing under the Articles of Confederation, and the
desire to guard against delegating excessive power to the central
government.
The drafters' answer to this dilemma was to provide that a national
6. Art. XIII of the Articles of Confederation provided that "[no] alteration [shall] at
any time hereafter be made in [these Articles . . .,] unless such alteration be agreed to
in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of
every State." U.S.C. xxxv, xxxviii (1976).
7. II THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 555 (M. Farrand ed. 1937)
[hereinafter cited without cross-reference as II FARRAND].
8. II FARRAND at 559. This provision was not discussed or altered in later debates on
Article V.
9. I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 202-03 (M. Farrand ed. 1937)
[hereinafter cited without cross-reference as I FARRAND].
10. II FARRAND at 558.
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convention to propose amendments be summoned at the request of
two-thirds of the state legislatures.1 Such a convention would be,
like Congress, a deliberative body with a national perspective, capable
of assessing the need for constitutional change as well as developing
proposals to be submitted for ratification; yet it would not be Congress
itself. Thus the convention mode of amendment would avoid both
the problem of congressional obstruction of needed reforms and the
problem posed by parochial state self-interest.
The debates of the Philadelphia Convention trace the evolution of
the delegates' decision to adopt a convention mode. The Virginia
Resolutions, presented at the outset of the Convention by Edmund
Randolph, made the first mention of the need to provide for amend-
ments and reflected Randolph's concern over the danger of congres-
sional control of the amendment process. The Thirteenth Virginia
Resolve, introduced on May 29, 1787, stated "that provision ought to
be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it
shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature
ought not to be required thereto."'12 Although some delegates did not
see the necessity of providing for amendment at all,' 3 the principal
issue, according to Madison's notes, was "the propriety of making the
consent of the Natl. Legisl. unnecessary."' 14 Randolph and Mason of
Virginia defended the part of the resolution that made congressional
assent unnecessary.' 5 The delegates were divided on the issue, how-
ever, and the Convention voted to postpone consideration of that part
of the resolution.' 6
When the Convention next addressed the resolution, the contro-
versial portion had been removed; Randolph's new Seventeenth Vir-
ginia Resolve simply read, "Resolved that provision ought to be made
11. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, conventions rather than legislatures
were considered to be the institutions that most nearly embodied popular sovereignty.
See generally G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 306-43
(1969). With regard to the decision to ratify the Constitution by convention in each state,
Professor Herman Ames wrote, "This was in harmony with the prevailing theory of the
age, namely, that the sovereign people spoke directly through a convention elected for a
specific purpose." Ames, Recent Development of the Amending Power as Applied to the
Federal Constitution, 72 PROC. Am. PHILOSOPHICAL Soc. 87, 92 (1933).
12. I THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 245 (M.
Jensen ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
13. I FARRAND at 202.
14. id.
15. See id. at 203 (statement of Mason) ("It would be improper to require the consent
of the Natl. Legislature, because they may abuse their power, and refuse their consent on
that very account. The opportunity for such an abuse, may be the fault of the Con-
stitution calling for amendmt.")
16. Id.
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for the amendment of the articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem
necessary."' 7 The resolution did not specify methods for either proposal
or ratification of amendments. The Convention submitted it in this
ambiguous form to the Committee of Detail on July 24.18 When a
draft constitution emerged from the Committee of Detail on August
6, the Nineteenth Article stated, "On the application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment of this
Constitution, the Legislature of the United States shall call a Conven-
tion for that purpose."'10 It is not clear whether this draft contemplated
that the states could apply for a convention specifically limited to con-
sideration of a particular amendment to the Constitution, or whether
the provision contemplated conventions with authority to provide
generally for the icvision and amendment of the Constitution.20 A more
serious defect was the article's failure to specify any method of ratifica-
tion.
Although the Convention approved the draft Article on August 30,21
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved to reconsider it on September
10.22 Gerry was troubled that a convention apparently could amend
the Constitution without any further requirement of ratification. He
feared that a majority at a convention could "bind the Union to in-
novations that may subvert the State-Constitutions altogether."23 His
motion was seconded by Hamilton, who "did not object to the con-
sequences stated by Mr. Gerry," 24 but opposed the Article for different
reasons. Hamilton warned that "[t]he State Legislatures will not apply
for alterations but with a view to increase their own powers. .... ,,25
Hamilton suggested that the national legislature be authorized to call
a constitutional convention upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of
both Houses. Roger Sherman proposed an amendment providing for
the national legislature to propose amendments without a convention. 2
17. I DOCUMENTARY HisTokY at 250.
18. Id. at 255, 259.
19. Id. at 269.
20. The ABA Report underscores the phrase "an amendment" in quoting this draft,
presumably to suggest that the draft contemplated that state legislatures would apply for
conventions to propose single amendments to the Constitution. ABA REPORT, supra note
5, at 12. The phrase used in the draft, however, is not "an amendment to" the Constitu-
tion, but rather "an amendment of" the Constitution. The more natural reading is that
this phrase is used in the sense of "a revision of" the Constitution.
21. II FA"AND at 467-68.
22. Id. at 557.
23. Id. at 557-58.
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Madison then offered the substitute draft that provided the struc-
ture and substance of what eventually became Article V. It read:
The Legislature of the U.S. whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the
Legislatures of the several States, shall propose amendments to this
Constitution which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part
thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths
at least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification
may be proposed by the Legislatures of the U.S.27
The Convention tentatively adopted Madison's proposal by a vote of
nine states in favor, one against, one divided. The Madison draft did
not provide for any convention method of proposing amendments;
Congress was to propose amendments "whenever two thirds of both
Houses shall deem necessary" or "on the application of two thirds of
the Legislatures of the several States." The article was submitted to
the Committee of Style,28 which returned it several days later with only
minor stylistic changes.2 9
On September 15, the Article was reconsidered by the Convention.
Debate centered on the section of the Madison draft that provided
that state legislatures could propose amendments, which Congress would
submit for state ratification.30 Since the draft gave authority to Con-
gress to propose amendments on its own initiative, it would seem to
follow that the provision permitting states to apply to Congress to
"propose amendments" would allow them to suggest the content of
those amendments. Thus, the most plausible reading of the Madison
proposal is that it would have permitted two-thirds of the state legisla-
tures to propose amendments to the Constitution; Congress would
merely transmit those amendments to be ratified.
The Constitutional Convention rejected that provision in Madison's
draft. On the motion of Gouverneur Morris and Elbridge Gerry, the
Convention voted without dissent to substitute language requiring
Congress to call a constitutional convention on the application of two-
thirds of the state legislatures.31 This accomplished the following
change in Article V: "The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both
houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Consti-
27. Id. at 559.
28. I DOCUMENTARY HIsToRY, at 270, 283.
29. II FARRAND, at 629.
30. Id. at 629-30.
31. Id.
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tution, or on the application -ef twe thirds of the legislatures of two
thirds of the several states, shall -prepese-amendments t-& ts -entita.
-iett, call a Convention for proposing Amendments, . "...,32
The accompanying discussion at the Convention does not clearly
reveal the basis for the changes. Under Madison's draft, there was no
guarantee that a national forum would be involved in the drafting of
amendment proposals. Roger Sherman, one of the two recorded
speakers, expressed "fears" in reference to the unamended Madison
proposal "that three fourths of the States might be brought to do things
fatal to particular States, as abolishing them altogether or depriving
them of their equality in the Senate."33 The Morris-Gerry motion
might be seen as responsive to Sherman's concern, 34 for it provided that
a national convention, rather than the states, would formulate proposed
amendments.
Mason of Virginia expressed a different-indeed, almost opposite-
objection to the Madison draft.35 In his opinion, the draft did not im-
pose a mandatory duty upon Congress to submit the state legislatures'
suggested amendments for ratification. Instead, he read it as giving
Congress either discretion to withhold the suggested amendments or
considerable influence in the drafting of the amendments. This plan
was "exceptionable & dangerous" in Mason's view:
As the proposing of amendments is in both the modes to depend,
in the first immediately, and in the second, ultimately, on Con-
gress, no amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained
by the people, if the Government should become oppressive, as he
verily believed would be the case.36
Though this seems a curious objection, given the seemingly mandatory
language of the Madison draft,37 it may have been based on Mason's
32. I DOCUMENTARY HisToRy at 284, 295. (The parts of the Article submitted to the
Convention by the Committee of Style and left unchanged are in roman type; the dele-
tions by the Convention are in lined-out type; changes made by the Convention are in
italics; stylistic changes are not reflected here.)
33. II FARRAND at 629.
34. It is possible that Sherman's objection might have been directed not at the alloca-
tion of authority to propose amendments, but rather at the lack of substantive limits on
the amending power. These objections were partially met by the subsequent action of
the delegates in adding a provision to Article V whereby no state could, without its con-
sent, be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.
35. II FAnxAN at 629.
36. Id.
37. Madison could not understand this objection in light of the delegates' clear ex-
pectation that Congress would call a convention in response to state applications: "Mr.
Madison did not see why Congress would not be as much bound to propose amendments
applied for by two thirds of the States as to call a Convention on the like application."
II FARuR wi at 629-30.
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belief in the practical necessity of having a single deliberative body
undertake the consultation, debate, drafting, compromise, and revision
necessary to produce an amendment.
Mason may have supposed that Congress, during the process of pro-
posing amendments in response to a variety of state applications, would
exercise great influence on the shape and substance of the amendments.
The Morris-Gerry alternative convention mode, however, could be read
as imposing a ministerial duty on Congress but not involving it in
shaping amendments. Mason as well as the other delegates could thus
support the requirement that Congress call a convention upon applica-
tion by the states as a plan that realistically limited the duty imposed
upon Congress, while leaving the determination of the subject matter
and the drafting of any amendments to the convention itself.38
II. Controlling the Agenda of Constitutional Conventions
The accounts of the Philadelphia Convention do not expressly
answer the question of whether a convention can be limited by either
the states or by Congress. Two themes, however, do emerge from the
debates: Congress should not have exclusive power to propose amend-
ments; and state legislatures should not be able to propose and ratify
amendments that enhance their power at the expense of the national
government. States were empowered under Article V to ratify amend-
ments; the power to propose amendments was lodged in two national
bodies, Congress and a convention. The proceedings suggest that the
framers did not want to permit enactment of amendments by a process
of state proposal followed by state ratification without the substantive
involvement of a national forum. Permitting the states to limit the
subject matter of a constitutional convention would be inconsistent
with this aim. If the state legislatures could not only control the text
of the proposed amendment, but also limit the convention to that
subject, effective proposal power would have been shifted to the state
legislatures. If the states could confine the convention to a general
38. Such a view of Article V is expressed in the first state application for a constitu-
tional convention, submitted by Virginia in 1787:
We do, therefore, in behalf of our constituents, in the most earnest and solemn
manner, make this application to Congress, that a convention be immediately called,
of deputies from the several States, with full power to take into their consideration
the defects of this Constitution that have been suggested by the State Conventions,
and report such amendments thereto as they shall find best suited to promote our
common interests, and secure to ourselves and our latest posterity the great and
unalienable rights of mankind.
I ANNALS OF CONGRSS at col. 259-60 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834) (emphasis added).
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subject, but not to a specific amendment, and the applying legislatures
suggested different limitations, then Congress would be forced to
define and enforce limits on the convention. Such action would con-
flict with a different aim of the drafters: the desire to create a mode
of proposing amendments in which Congress played no significant role.
In order to satisfy the various objectives of the framers, a convention
must be free to define for itself the subject matter it will address; the
state legislatures may call for such a convention, but they should not
be permitted to control it.
A. Conventions Limited to a Single Amendment
The most stringent limitation upon a convention would be a con-
gressional requirement that it consider only a draft amendment, the
wording of which had been ordained in advance by the applying state
legislatures. One example of this kind of limitation is found in Dela-
ware's 1975 application to Congress "to call a convention for the
proposing of the following amendment to the Constitution of the
United States: ... The costs of operating the Federal Government shall
not exceed its income during any fiscal year, except in the event of
declared war. ' 39 The Delaware application makes clear the state's
desire to limit the convention to consideration of this amendment. The
application expressly states that
the General Assembly of the State of Delaware interprets Article
V to mean that if two-thirds of the states make application for a
convention to propose an identical amendment to the Constitu-
tion for ratification with a limitation that such amendment be the
only matter before it, that such convention would have power only
to propose the specified amendment and would be limited to such
proposal and would not have power to vary the text therof nor
would it have power to propose other amendments on the same or
different propositions.40
Professor Van Alstyne, an advocate of the view that state-imposed
limitations on the authority of conventions are constitutionally per-
missible, has argued that
Congress could least decline to call a convention if, in keeping
with [thirty-four resolutions such as Delaware's] the sole function
of that convention would be to do no more than to deliberate and
39. Del. H. Con. Res. No. 36 (1975), reprinted in 125 CONG. RFc. S1307 (daily ed. Feb.
8, 1979).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
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to debate the pros and cons of an exactly particularized proposal,
with choice at the convention's conclusion for the delegates only
to vote 'yea' or 'nay.'41
He argues that the framers intended the states to have a ready means
of curing defects that Congress would not address, and suggests that
[i]f two-thirds of the state legislatures might perchance agree on
the exact wording of an amendment they would wish to be re-
viewed in a called convention for discussion and vote, this would
seem to me to state the paradigm case in which Congress should
proceed with the call-and limit the agenda exactly in accordance
with the unequivocal expressions of those solely responsible for the
event.
42
This approach, though it provides a means of proposing amendments
that is free of congressional control, is not responsive to the second aim
of the Philadelphia Convention; state legislatures should not be given
authority to propose amendments without the involvement of some
national body in the formulation of such amendments. To permit the
state legislatures to dictate to the convention the exact terms of its
proposals is to short-circuit the carefully structured division of authority
between state and national interests.
If the aim had been to give the state legislatures the power to pro-
pose as well as to ratify amendments, it would have been unnecessary
to provide for conventions. The drafters could simply have provided
that when two-thirds of the state legislatures agree on the wording of
an amendment, some central authority must automatically submit that
amendment for ratification by the required three-fourths of the states.
Of course, a convention whose sole authority would be to vote "yes"
or "no" on a proposal dictated in advance by state legislatures could,
by delaying the amendment process, serve an important function by
allowing time for reflection and debate and by providing an additional
hurdle for any proposed amendment. Assembling a tightly controlled
convention for this limited purpose, however, would have made little
sense to the drafters in 1787. The difficulty of choosing and assembling
delegates from all the states was extraordinary; commencement of na-
tional meetings was sometimes delayed for weeks by the late arrival of
many of the delegates.43 Delegates to such a convention would likely
41. Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 1305.
42. Id. at 1305-06.
43. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 54 (1913)
(Constitutional Convention called to meet on May 14, 1787, but "(p]artly owing to the
difficulties and slowness of travel . . . it was not until Friday, the twenty-fifth of May,
that seven states were represented and the convention could proceed to organize.")
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be frustrated by the delay and anxious to get on with the sole official
act permitted them: voting on an amendment whose wording had been
determined beforehand. The framers understood that "[c]onventions
are serious things," 44 and it is doubtful that they meant to suggest such
a meeting by the phrase "a Convention for proposing Amendments."
B. Conventions Limited to a Particular Subject
Even when the applying state legislatures seek only to limit the con-
vention with respect to subject matter, the case against the validity of
the applications is still persuasive. Narrowly defined subject matter
limits have to a lesser extent the same difficulty as limits that confine
a convention to consideration of a specific text: they transfer the pro-
posing power from the convention to the state legislatures. The more
restricted the alternatives available to a convention, the greater the
chance that any amendment will in effect have been predetermined. 45
Moreover, restricting the convention's subject matter may have a
deleterious effect on the amendment process. The framers knew from
their experience in Philadelphia that issues are often fundamentally
redefined in the course of their resolution; accommodations in seem-
ingly unrelated areas may permit resolution of complex issues in an
unanticipated manner. Narrowly defining in advance the subject matter
of a convention would seriously hamper the process of creative com-
promise that had been central to the success of the Philadelphia
Convention.
Although this predetermination argument applies less directly to
broader limitations on a convention, other problems arise if only
general subject matter limitations are imposed. Such limits differ im-
portantly from "exact text" limitations in that the process of setting
the subject matter agenda of a convention is likely to give Congress a
significant degree of control over the convention. It is conceivable that
thirty-four state legislatures would agree on exactly the same limitation
of a convention's subject matter. However, it is more likely that state
44. II FARRAND at 632 (statement of Charles Pinkney).
45. This critical point is overlooked in both the California Memorandum, supra note
5, and the ABA REPoRT, suPra note 5. The California Memorandum states:
The notion that the states lack the power to limit a convention is also at war with
the principle major continet in se minus; that is, absent an expressed intent to the
contrary, a body vested with specified powers inherently possesses and may exercise
lesser powers. As stated by the ABA Committee, "since Article V specifically and
exclusively vests the state Legislatures with the authority to apply for a convention,
we perceive no sound reason as to why they cannot invoke limitations in exercising
that authority."
California Memorandum, supra note 5, at 14. The difficulty with this argument is its un-
warranted assumption that the power to define a convention's agenda and restrict its
deliberations is a lesser power than the authority to call the convention.
1633
The Yale Law Journal
applications would vary in both their description of the problem giving
rise to the applications, and their suggested revisions. Congress, in
framing the call for the convention, would then assume a major role
in defining the subject matter.46 That role should be left to the con-
vention itself in order to avoid undue congressional influence over the
convention mode of amendment.47
Proponents of the view that "limited convention" applications are
valid also rely on the argument that the convention mode should be
free of congressional control. Professor Van Alstyne argues that con-
46. An alternative solution would leave the definition and enforcement of any limits
to the judiciary. The courts could enjoin the ratification process on the ground that an
amendment proposal was not within the subject matter limits set by the original ap-
plications, or could refuse to give effect to the amendment after ratification on the ground
that it was beyond the proposing authority of the convention. This alternative would
merely substitute judicial control of the convention for congressional control. There is
nothing in the deliberations to indicate that the drafters contemplated either congressional
or judicial control over the subject matter of a constitutional convention.
47. Consider the example of the Bill of Rights. Several state conventions accompanied
ratification of the Constitution with a recommendation that amendments be adopted.
Different states proposed different amendments on a variety of subjects. Compare the
amendments proposed by Virginia, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, vol. 3 at 657-63 (J.
Elliot ed. 1937) with the proposals by Massachusetts, id., vol. 2 at 176-78. Had these
amendments been proposed by convention rather than by Congress, it would have been
highly inappropriate for Congress, the body whose powers were to be constrained by a
number of the suggested revisions, to attempt to limit the questions to be considered.
It does not appear to have occurred to James Madison that Congress could call a
"limited" convention to propose a bill of rights. In a letter written to George Eve on
Jan. 2, 1789, Madison expressed his preference, under the circumstances, for the congres-
sional mode of proposing amendments:
The Congress who will be appointed to execute as well as to amend the Government,
will probably be careful not to destroy or endanger it. A Convention, on the other
hand, meeting in the present ferment of parties, and containing perhaps insidious
characters from different parts of America, would at least spread a general alarm,
and be but too likely to turn everything into confusion and uncertainty. It is to be
observed however that the question concerning a General Convention, will not belong
to the federal Legislature. If 2/3 of the States apply for one, Congress cannot refuse
to call it; if not, the other mode of amendments must be pursued.
5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 321 (G. Hunt ed. 1904). In a letter to Phillip Mazzei
dated December 10, 1788, Madison stated his belief that
The object of the Anti-Federalists is to bring about another general Convention,
which would either agree on nothing, as would be agreeable to some, and throw
everything into confusion, or expunge from the Constitution parts which are held by
its friends to be essential to it.
rd. at 316. Madison did not suggest the possibility of countering the drive for a "general
convention" by seeking to limit the convention's subject matter authority in advance. See
Martin, Madison's Precedent of Legislative Ratification for Constitutional Amendments,
109 PRoc. AM. PHILOSOPHICAL Soc. 47, 49-50 (1965).
Two passages in The Federalist, one of them by Madison, have been cited in support
of the position that the framers believed "the convention need not be unlimited in scope."
Note, supra note 5, at 1629. This argument has been rebutted by Professor Black, see
Black, supra note 4, at 197, and is further undermined by these passages from Madison's
correspondence.
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gressional authority to treat "limited" applications as invalid could be
used to obstruct state initiation of constitutional conventions:
the state mode for getting amendments proposed was not to be
contingent upon any significant cooperation or discretion in Con-
gress. ... Congress was supposed to be mere clerk of the process
convoking state-called conventions. Certainly it was not imag-
ined to sit astride that process as a hostile censor, a body entitled
to impose such stringent requirements upon the states as effec-
tively to render the state mode of securing particular amendments
nearly impossible.48
This point is not without merit. A generous construction by Congress
of what constitutes a valid application may be seen as most consistent
with the limited role Congress was to perform under the convention
mode of amendment. But if Congress is to be "mere clerk of the
process," it should leave the influential task of agenda-setting to the
convention itself. Moreover, Congress could establish a precedent that
applications are valid if and only if applying states understand that the
convention will be free to set its own limits. This determination would
be significantly less intrusive than if Congress were to undertake with
each set of applications to infer and enforce limits on the subject matter
authority of the convention. 49
It is possible that a set of state applications could establish subject
matter limitations sufficiently broad to provide latitude for com-
promise and consensus-building at the convention and sufficiently
uniform to enable Congress to define and enforce those limits without
48. Van Alstyne, suPra note 5, at 1303.
49. The extent to which Congress could exercise influence over a "limited convention"
is suggested by the provisions of the Ervin Bill, which passed the Senate in 1971, S. 215,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNG. REc. 36804-06 (1971), but was not acted upon by the House.
The Ervin Bill sought to establish in advance procedures by which a constitutional con-
vention would be called if Congress ever received the requisite number of applications.
The bill was thoroughly premised upon a "limited convention" view of Article V and
provided, among other things: that each state resolution should "stat[e] the nature of
the amendment or amendments to be proposed," id. at § 2; that Congress, in calling
the convention, should "set forth the nature of the amendment or amendments for the
consideration of which the convention is called," id. at § 6(a); that "[b]efore taking his seat
each delegate shall subscribe to an oath ... to refrain from proposing ... [any] amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States relating to any subject which is not named
... in the concurrent resolution of the Congress by which the convention was called," id.
at § 8(a); that "[n]o convention . . . may propose any amendment or amendments of a
nature different from that stated in the concurrent resolution [of Congress] calling the
convention," id. at § 10(b); and that questions concerning whether a proposed amendment
is within the limits set by the congressional resolution "shall be determined solely by the
Congress of the United States .. ." id. at § 13(c).
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unduly intruding into the convention's work."° It is more likely, how-
ever, that state applications attempting to limit the subject matter of
a convention will result in either impermissible state control of the
proposal process or undue congressional influence over that process.r'
Consequently, while a convention should be influenced in its choice
of agenda by the grievances that led the states to apply for its con-
vocation, the authority to determine the agenda and to draft the
amendments to be proposed should rest with the convention rather than
with Congress or the state legislatures.
III. Determining the Validity of State Applications
If Congress and the state legislatures lack the power to limit a con-
stitutional convention to consideration of a particular amendment or
subject, the issue arises whether state applications calling for Congress
to convene a limited convention are valid. Professor Charles Black
argues that, "[s]tate requests for a limited convention create no obliga-
tion under Article V, since they are not applications for the thing
which, and only which, the States may oblige Congress to call." 2
Professor Black rejects the argument that a state's request for a limited
convention should be treated as an application for an unlimited con-
vention. 53
There is often a question, however, whether a state has in fact called
for a limited convention. Nothing in the argument against the limita-
tion of subject matter suggests that states may not validly recommend
that a convention deal with a single subject, or that it consider a draft
text of an amendment, so long as the applications do not assume that
the applying state legislatures or Congress can limit the convention's
agenda. For example, a state application that requests Congress to call
a convention, and recommends that the convention be limited to con-
sideration of an amendment requiring a balanced federal budget,
should be deemed valid, provided it is clear that the suggested limit
is only a recommendation.
50. An example of a limited convention that would involve minimal congressional
control is one called for the sole purpose of repealing an earlier amendment. In that
case, strict definition of the subject in state applications would preclude a convention
from considering options such as a partial repeal.
51. Although it is possible to imagine a hypothetical set of legislative applications
requiring a limited convention that might not as seriously implicate the concerns that
animated the drafters, it is those possibilities that are most likely that should influence
our interpretation of what the drafters meant by "a Convention for proposing Amend-
ments."
52. Black, supra note 4, at 199-200 (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 200.
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An application may be ambiguous on this last point. Suppose that a
state legislature applies to Congress for a constitutional convention
"for the purpose of" proposing an amendment, the text of which is set
out in the application. The use of the phrase "for the purpose of" is
not necessarily inconsistent with recognition by the applying legislature
that the convention would be free to consider other amendments.
Nevertheless, in light of the widespread assumption that the state
legislatures and Congress can impose subject matter limits on a con-
vention,54 the applying legislature may have assumed that the conven-
tion would be strictly limited to considering the suggested draft
amendment. Before summoning a convention, Congress ought to be
confident that those who applied for the convention did so with a
proper understanding of the convention's authority.
State applications recently submitted to Congress, calling for a con-
vention on a balanced federal budget, illustrate this point. With one
or two exceptions,5t the thirty "balanced budget" applications are
clearly premised on the assumption that a convention's subject matter
can be limited by the state legislatures and Congress. At least twenty-
two of the applications request Congress to call a convention "for the
specific and exclusive purpose" 50 or "the sole and exclusive purpose"5 7
of proposing an amendment requiring a balanced federal budget. If
Congress lacks the power to limit a convention to consideration of a
particular amendment, then these applications request something that
Congress cannot grant. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that
every state that requested a convention for the "sole and exclusive"
purpose of approving a draft amendment would wish Congress, if it
could not call a limited convention, to call instead a convention free
to set its own agenda.
This last point need not be left to conjecture, however; a number
of state resolutions are explicit on this point, and render any debate
over the proper treatment of such applications academic. The Colorado
legislature, for example, in applying for a convention for "the specific
and exclusive purpose" of proposing an amendment prohibiting "def-
icit spending," expressly resolved "that this application and request
be deemed null and void, rescinded, and of no effect in the event that
54. See note 5 supra.
55. See, e.g., N.D. S. Con. Res. No. 4018 (1975), reprinted in 125 CONe. REC. S1310
(daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979) (calling "for a convention for such purpose as provided by Article
V of the Constitution," while proposing specific balanced budget amendment).
56. See, e.g., Ala. H.J. Res. 227 (1976), reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. S1306 (daily ed. Feb.
8, 1979) (emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., Kan. S. Con. Res. 1661 (1978), reprinted in 125 CONG. R c. S1307 (daily
ed. Feb. 8, 1979) (emphasis added).
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such convention not be limited to such specific and exclusive pur-
pose." 5 The applications submitted to Congress by Idaho 9 and North
Carolina6 ° contain similar restrictions. The Utah application expresses
its limitation even more precisely, resolving
that this application for a Convention Call for proposing amend-
ments be limited to the subject matter of this Resolution and that
the State of Utah be counted as part of the necessary two-thirds
states for such a call only if the convention is limited to the sub-
ject matter of this Resolution. 6'
Thus, if Congress lacks the power to limit a convention to the exclusive
consideration of a particular narrow amendment, applications such as
these, now being counted as part of the total, simply self-destruct. They
are obviously invalid under the test set out, as are other applications
that erroneously assume congressional authority to limit a convention.
IV. The Viability of an Unlimited Convention
If neither the state legislatures nor Congress may limit a convention's
agenda, the question arises whether the only kind of convention con-
templated by Article V is one to revise the entire Constitution. Pro-
fessor Black suggests that the convention -method was designed to pro-
vide "some means of compelling a thorough reconsideration of the
new plan."0 2 The convention mechanism, in Professor Bruce Acker-
man's view, should be reserved for those occasions "when the states are
willing to assert the need for an unconditional reappraisal of constitu-
tional foundations."0 3 If conventions must propose general revisions,
then Professor Van Alstyne is correct in observing that it "all but
eliminates [Article V's] use in response to specific, limited state dis-
satisfactions."0 4
There is, however, no basis in Article V for asserting that a conven-
tion is required to reappraise the whole Constitution, or that states
58. Colo. S. J. Mem. 1 (1978), reprinted in 125 CoNG. REc. S1306-07 (daily ed. Feb. 8,
1979).
59. Idaho H. Con. Res. 7 (1979), reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. S1932 (daily ed. Mar.
1, 1979).
60. N.C. S. J. Res. 5 (1979), reprinted in 125 CONe. REc. S1123 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1979).
61. Utah H.J. Res. 12 (1979), reprinted in 125 CONG. REC. S2363-64 (daily ed. Mfar.
8, 1979).
62. Black, supra note 4, at 201.
63. Ackerman, Unconstitutional Convention, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 1979, at 8.
64. Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 1303. Ackerman's argument permits Van Alstyne to
characterize this position as one that tells the states that they may not seek a convention
for the purpose of considering the repeal of one amendment "unless they mean also to
consider a repeal of the other twenty-five and of all six articles as well (and to manifest
that willingness in the resolutions they submit to Congress) .. " Id. at 1306.
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would have to favor such revision before they could apply for a con-
vention. It is reasonable to expect that a convention would choose to
confine itself to considering amendments addressing the problem that
led states to apply for the convention. If the prospect of a "runaway
convention"0 5 is frightening,06 then delegate candidates are likely to
campaign for office on a pledge to limit the convention's agenda and
that pledge is likely to have popular appeal. While some delegates
would undoubtedly lobby to have the convention propose amend-
ments on other subjects, such appeals would not be likely to commend
themselves to a majority of the delegates. 7
It is probably true that the state legislatures "would be less likely
to take advantage of the convention method of amendment if they
believed a convention, once convened, would be free to propose drastic
changes."0 s If a convention is free to set its own agenda, there is a
chance that the convention, in spite of the recommendations of the
applying states, would consider subjects other than those recommended.
However, a majority of delegates would have to be persuaded to sup-
port those amendments on "extraneous" subjects, and three-fourths of
the states would still have to ratify them. Thus it is unlikely that dele-
gates at the Philadelphia Convention considered this risk to be so sub-
stantial that they would have assumed that no convention would be
viable unless Congress and the applying states could control its delibera-
tions. Moreover, Congress itself was granted unlimited power to pro-
pose constitutional amendments; there is no reason why a convention,
possessed of the very same authority to propose amendments, would
have been viewed by the drafters as too frightening a prospect to be a
practical method of proposing amendments. 9
65. As Professor Black has noted, the term "runaway convention" is a misnomer. If a
properly called convention is constitutionally free to exercise its own judgment about the
limits of its deliberations, then "no convention can be called that has anything to run
away from." Black, supra note 4, at 199. I use the term here to refer to a convention that,
acting within its constitutional authority, proposes an amendment different from the
amendment sought by those who requested the convention.
The California Memorandum, in arguing for the validity of applications for a limited
convention, suggests that one defense against a "runaway convention" is "the enormous
control that Congress can and should impose upon a constitutional convention." California
Memorandum, supra note 5, at 22. The argument here is that such control is impermis-
sible and is likely to be unnecessary.
66. In 1789, James Madison opposed the calling of a convention to propose a Bill of
Rights, for fear that it would "turn everything into confusion." See note 47 suPra.
67. But cf. W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 242 (4th ed.
1977) ("logrolling" enables minority positions to gain majority support).
68. Note, supra note 5, at 1629.
69. This point was apparently overlooked by the author of the California Memoran-
dum, who states that if the legislatures and Congress lack the power to limit the agenda
of a constitutional convention, then the convention would be an unthinkable "black hole
of absolute power." California Memorandum, supra note 5, at 16.
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Conclusion
If the legislatures of thirty-four states request Congress to call a
general constitutional convention, Congress has a constitutional duty
to summon such a convention. If those thirty-four states recommend
in their applications that the convention consider only a particular
subject, Congress still must call a convention and leave to the conven-
tion the ultimate determination of the agenda and the nature of the
amendments it may choose to propose. If, however, a state's applica-
tion is based on the erroneous assumption that Congress is empowered
to impose subject-matter limits on the convention, such an application
must be considered invalid. Many of the state applications calling for
a convention on a balanced budget amendment are invalid under this
test. Congress has no authority to call a convention in the absence of
valid applications from two-thirds of the states. Therefore, even if the
total number of applications reaches thirty-four, Congress must decline
to call a constitutional convention.
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